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Prospects for Liberalizing the Regulation of
Foreign Lawyers Under GATS and NAFTA
Orlando Flores*
The continued expansion of world trade has created a grow-
ing need for international legal services.' Lawyers from all na-
tions are increasingly traveling and settling in foreign countries
to meet this need.2 Lawyers' efforts to settle in foreign coun-
tries, 3 however, have met with strong resistance from both local
bar associations and governments, resulting in the imposition of
numerous restrictions on foreign lawyers. 4 These restrictions-
some necessary and some not-have created an inefficient envi-
ronment for the delivery of legal services by foreign lawyers. 5
Although it is difficult to calculate the value of trade lost
because of restrictions on the practice of foreign lawyers,6 coun-
* The author would like to express his thanks to Steven C. Nelson for his
insightful comments on the topic.
1. James Andrews, NAFTA: Free Trade and the Rule of Law, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 1993, at 13.
2. In New York, for example, there are lawyers from at least 45 different
countries, "from Argentina to Uruguay." Hope B. Engel, New York's Rules on
Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36 (MarJApr. 1994).
3. Throughout this Note, "foreign country" refers to a country where a
lawyer is not licensed to practice law. "Foreign lawyer" refers to a lawyer li-
censed to practice law in one country but seeking to practice elsewhere. For
instance, a lawyer licensed in the United States and practicing in Britain is a
"foreign lawyer," until he or she becomes licensed in Britain.
4. Pratap Chaterjee, Bar Association Fails to Agree on Code for Working
Abroad, FIN. TImEs, Oct. 1, 1990, at 14 (noting that "most countries .... have
barriers that can make it quite difficult for the foreign lawyer to [even] advise
on the laws of his or her own country"). See infra Part II (discussing the most
prevalent regulations of foreign lawyers).
5. The situation of Tianlong Yu, a Chinese lawyer working for the Indian-
apolis law firm of Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, illustrates such inefficiency. Bill
Koenig, Swearing-in Lets Chinese Attorney Represent New Area of Indiana Law,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, US file.
When Yu began working at the law firm, Indiana did not allow foreign lawyers
to give advice on the law of any country unless they were members of the local
bar. Id. Since Yu could not advise Indiana clients on Chinese law, he was
forced to brief Ice Miller attorneys "who in turn would advise clients." Id. This
process increases the cost of delivering legal services to the firm's clients.
6. Foreword to U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 4 (1994) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE
BAmERs].
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tries throughout the world recognize the need to liberalize the
regulation of foreign lawyers. This Note describes the most sig-
nificant efforts and explores the prospects for further liberaliza-
tion. Part I explains the typical practice and activities of foreign
lawyers. Part II describes many of the barriers that foreign law-
yers face when they seek to provide legal services. Part III then
examines the efforts to liberalize and standardize the regulation
of foreign lawyers in the European Union and the United States,
and concludes with an analysis of the provisions relating to legal
services included in the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices 7 (GATS) and the North American Free Trade Agreement"
(NAFTA). Part IV examines the prospects for continued liberali-
zation in this area, based on the GATS and NAFTA models.
I. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN LAWYERS
Foreign lawyers facilitate international transactions, 9 ex-
pand the flow of goods 10 and increase trade in other types of
services, "particularly in such sectors as financial services which
are especially law-intensive."1" More concretely, foreign law-
yers' practice usually consists of advising clients on interna-
tional commercial matters. This includes advising on
international finance, tax planning, corporate and securities
law, franchising, licensing, distribution and commercial agency,
joint ventures, competition law, arbitration and general interna-
tional law.12
7. Annex II of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, I.E.L. I-B-64 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
9. FoREiuN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6, at 167 (noting that "the Gov-
ernment of Japan recognized the important role that lawyers play in facilitat-
ing international transactions.. ."); see generally Roger J. Goebel, Professional
Qualification and Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign
Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TuL. L. REv. 443 (1989) (discussing the
role of lawyers in facilitating transactions between negotiators from different
cultures).
10. See, e.g., Countries Seen Continuing to Seek Liberalized Trade in Legal
Services, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1247 (Aug. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Trade in
Legal Services]; Andrews, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting Gary Horlick, lawyer in
O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. office, as saying that "[1]awyers help fa-
cilitate international trade and investment by explaining the rules.").
11. American Bar Association, Section of International Law and Practice,
Report to the House of Delegates: Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consul-
tants, 28 INT'L LAW. 207, 216 (1994) [hereinafter Model Rule].
12. See Goebel, supra note 9 at 509; see also DENNIS CAMPBELL and JACK J.
COE JR., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: A SuRvEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 2-
4 (D. Campbell ed., 1982).
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Foreign lawyers usually provide their services in one of two
contexts. First, law firms hire and "import" foreign lawyers to
their home office to advise domestic clients on the law of the for-
eign lawyers' home country. 13 More commonly, law firms send
their own lawyers abroad 14 to establish or staff a foreign branch
office. 15 These branch offices enable law firms to meet the needs
of a "new breed and range of clients-including domestic clients
with business abroad and foreign clients doing business with do-
mestic partners-[which are] placing new demands on the legal
profession worldwide for the delivery of legal services across na-
tional boundaries."' 6 Among these demands is the clients'
strong preference to work with a single law firm in transna-
tional transactions 7-the "desire for one stop shopping."18
13. See, e.g., Koenig, supra note 5, at E01. Such was the case when the
Sexton & Stiphany law firm hired a Venezuelan lawyer, Juan Vicente
Urdenetta, to work at the firm's headquarters in Miami, Florida. First Foreign
Lawyer Certified by Florida Bar; New Florida Bar Rule Allows Limited Practice
by Foreign Lawyers, Bus. Wire, Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Market li-
brary, Bwire file. This move directly benefited the firm's clients because they
could, "without leaving the state of Florida,... obtain counsel on legal matters
in Venezuela." Id.
14. It is very difficult to estimate the number of foreign lawyers that staff
law firms' foreign branch offices. Some jurisdictions keep poor track of foreign
lawyers who practice in their jurisdiction. Cynthia Cooper, Despite Loopholes,
N.Y. Admission Rule is National Model, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1993, at 5. In many
cases foreign lawyers work in law firms' branches without authorization from
the local authorities, so their numbers are not easily tabulated. Id. See also
Richard Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 737, 760-61
(1994). Yet other foreign lawyers practice abroad under umbrella licenses
granted to entire branch offices. See China: 12 Law Firms Open Offices Under
Interim Regulations, 9 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1975 (Nov. 18, 1992). One author
estimates that American law firms, which are the most internationalized, em-
ploy less than 2,000 lawyers in their foreign branch offices, although the figure
includes foreign qualified lawyers practicing local law. Abel, supra, at 738.
15. Another way to establish foreign branches is to hire local lawyers.
Baker & McKenzie, the largest multinational law firm in the world, has used
this strategy to expand internationally. Abel, supra note 14, at 780. However,
many law firms dislike this approach. Among the many issues that it raises are
whether the local profession permits it, whether local firms will cut off referrals
because they resent the foreign branch's local law capacity and whether local
lawyers can become partners. Id. at 744-45. There are also cultural difficulties
in managing lawyers from different nationalities which law firms may want to
avoid. Id. at 745.
16. Engel, supra note 2, at 36. See also Abel, supra note 14, at 743 (noting
that a law firm's decision to open a branch office is usually driven by corporate
clients).
17. See Jonathan Barsade, The Effect of EC Regulations Upon the Ability of
U.S. Lawyers to Establish a Pan-European Practice, 28 INT'L LAw. 313, 315
(1994) (noting that businesses prefer to use only one lawyer or law firm in
16zA. J GLOBAL TRADE
A client's desire to work with one lawyer or law firm-usu-
ally one based domestically-to satisfy its international legal
needs is only natural.1 9 If a client's domestic law firm does not
provide international legal services, the client must secure dif-
ferent lawyers, either directly or indirectly through their domes-
tic law firm, in each foreign country where the client conducts
business. 20 This new layer of lawyers can greatly increase a cli-
ent's expenses. 21 Ensuring open and effective communication
with the foreign counsel 22 further increases expenses.
To a law firm's foreign clients, the presence of a branch of-
fice staffed with lawyers from the law firm's home office is also
important. Many foreign clients believe that such presence "in-
dicates the commitment" of a law firm to the foreign clients'
market.23 As an American lawyer working in Toronto noted,
"the ability to walk across the street to meet with clients is vi-
tal."2 4 For this reason, many law firms maintain expensive
branch offices in Tokyo, staffed with lawyers from the home
office. 2
5
Recognizing the growing importance of foreign lawyers'
practice, countries sought to liberalize and harmonize their reg-
ulation both in GATS 26 and NAFTA.27 In spite of these efforts,
the regulation of foreign lawyers continues to be highly
restrictive.28
II. THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS
Foreign lawyers are generally subject to one of two regula-
tory regimes.29 Some jurisdictions require foreign lawyers to be
transactions that entail cross-border elements "to ensure reliable and efficient
lines of communication, consistent service, and ease of quality control").
18. Trade in Legal Services, supra note 10, at 1247 (quoting Peter D.
Ehrenhaft, partner at Bryan & Cave in Washington D.C.).
19. Sir Thomas Lund, Problems and Developments in Foreign Practice, 59
A.BA_ J. 1154, 1155 (1973).
20. Barsade, supra note 17, at 315.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Michael Crawford, Law Societies Will Have to Grapple with Foreign
Consultants, FIN. POST, Oct. 3, 1991, at 16.
24. Id.
25. Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT. L. J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 17 (noting
that most law firms with Tokyo branch offices stay because they believe that
"client convenience requires it.").
26. GATS, supra note 7. See infra Part III.
27. NAFTA, supra note 8. See infra Part III.
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text and infra Part III.
29. Abel, supra note 14, at 755.
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admitted as local lawyers before they may give advice on any
kind of law.30 Once foreign lawyers are licensed locally, they are
treated as any other local lawyer and are usually no longer sub-
ject to special restrictions. However, the full requalification re-
quirement is a very significant barrier to the entry of foreign
lawyers into the market.3 '
Many jurisdictions 32 reserve a special professional license
for foreign lawyers called the foreign legal consultancy license.
33
To qualify for this license, foreign lawyers normally do not face
restrictions such as examinations or adaptation periods. 34 In-
stead, they are licensed as foreign legal consultants3 5 based on
their own professional qualifications. To obtain the license they
must also meet a number of requirements, many of which are
discussed below, and are then limited in their scope of
practice. 36
Without question, some level of regulation of foreign law-
yers is needed to protect the public from unqualified lawyers and
to preserve the integrity of the local legal profession.37 Certain
30. Id.
31. See infra Part Il.B.
32. In the United States, seventeen states license foreign legal consultants.
Edward A. Adams, U.S. Lawyers Lose Opportunities in GATT Agreement, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 17, 1993, at 1. In Canada, provinces that license foreign legal consul-
tants include Ontario, British Colombia and Saskatchewan. Jim Middlemiss,
Cross-Border Opportunities Opening Up, FIN. PosT, Jan. 25, 1994, at 14. Other
countries that license foreign legal consultants include Belgium, Germany and
Japan. Foreign Lawyer Practice Rules, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 17, 1993, at 8.
33. See Abel, supra note 14, at 755.
34. See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. v.23, pt. 2, r. 988 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. CT.
R.§ 521.1.
35. New York, the first American jurisdiction to create a special category
for foreign lawyers, calls foreign lawyers that qualify under such category "for-
eign legal consultants." Gary Spencer, Court of Appeals Suggests Rules Easing
Way for Foreign Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 1993, at 1.
36. Robert Lutz, Ethics and International Practice: A Guide to the Profes-
sional Responsibilities of Practitioners, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 53, 74 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Niels Fisch-Thomsen, Lawyers and Legal Services 17, OECD
Doc. DAFFE/INV/PROF(94)18 (Sept. 8, 1994) (noting the consensus within the
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE) that
regulation is needed to protect the consumer of legal services as well as the
legal profession); Japan Said to Eye Easing Rules on Foreign Lawyers Practic-
ing in Japan, Intl Bus. & Fin. Daily, Mar. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA
library, BNAIBF file (noting that Japan regulates foreign lawyers "to ensure
that the profession of lawyers is for serving the public.. .") [hereinafter Japan
Said to Eye Easing Rules]; Annie Eun-ah Lee, Toward Institutionalization of
Reciprocity in Transnational Legal Services: A Proposal for a Multilateral Con-
vention Under the Auspices of GATT, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 91, 115
(1990) ("A country or a state has an interest in preserving the integrity of its
bar"); Model Rule, supra note 11, at 216 n.23 (noting that in the view of the
1996]
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restrictions on foreign lawyers' practice, however, may not be
justified by a genuine concern for the public, but rather by pro-
tectionism or by unfounded fears of foreign lawyers' lack of qual-
ifications. Attempts to liberalize the regulation of foreign
lawyers must address the concerns that led to these restrictions.
Therefore, it is useful to review the most prevalent restrictions
on foreign lawyers' practice and the primary arguments for and
against their imposition.38
A. SCOPE OF PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS
Jurisdictions that allow foreign lawyers to practice without
requalifying as local lawyers limit the scope of their practice.
Areas of the law that require intimate familiarity with local
laws and procedures are normally off-limits. For instance, for-
eign lawyers in Britain, a jurisdiction known for its hospitality
to foreign lawyers,3 9 "may not appear in a court proceeding, pre-
pare courtroom documents, undertake probate work, or prepare
documents for the transfer of real estate."40 New York, also
known for its openness to foreign lawyers, has similar practice
restrictions. 41 These restrictions protect the public because they
prevent foreign lawyers from advising in areas that require spe-
cial training and in-depth knowledge of local law, which foreign
lawyers generally do not possess.
Apart from these basic restrictions, many jurisdictions only
allow foreign lawyers to advise on the law of their home jurisdic-
tion because they fear that foreign lawyers may not be properly
qualified.42 These jurisdictions forbid foreign lawyers from ad-
American Bar Association (ABA), the main reasons for regulation are "first, the
protection of the public ... and, second, the preservation of the integrity of, and
public respect for, the legal profession").
38. The same concerns that led jurisdictions to impose the following re-
strictions on foreign lawyers also led some jurisdictions to require foreign law-
yers to fully requalify and become licensed locally. Thus, attempts to liberalize
the regulation of foreign lawyers should hopefully lead these jurisdictions to
adopt a more flexible regulatory scheme.
39. See Robert Lever, Bars to Practice; Will Only European Community Na-
tionals be Able to Perform Legal Work in EC Countries?, TEx. LAw., July 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, TEX library, TXLAWR file.
40. Goebel, supra note 9, at 479.
41. Foreign legal consultants licensed in New York are forbidden from ap-
pearing for another person in court, preparing trust or estate documents and
preparing any document respecting marital or parental rights. Engel, supra
note 2, at 36.
42. See, e.g., Model Rule, supra note 11, at 227 (indicating that Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Texas, Michigan and Illinois all have
164 [Vol. 5:159
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vising their clients on third-country 43 and international law.
These restrictions are significant obstacles to foreign lawyers be-
cause they usually need to advise their clients on the totality of
the transaction, which may even include certain aspects of local
law.44
The concern over foreign lawyers' qualifications is at least
partially justified because jurisdictions do not control the educa-
tional and licensing requirements of foreign lawyers and have a
limited capacity to evaluate their qualifications. 45 Jurisdictions
may be especially concerned with the education of foreign law-
yers licensed in jurisdictions with completely different legal sys-
tems. For example, this may be the case when foreign lawyers
trained in a common law system seek to practice in a civil code
jurisdiction. Concern over foreign lawyers' lack of qualifications
is heightened when dealing with lawyers from jurisdictions that
impose loose ethical obligations.
Perhaps the strongest reason for eliminating broad scope of
practice limitations is the high level of sophistication of foreign
lawyers' typical clients. For most foreign lawyers, typical clients
are governments, multinational corporations and financial insti-
tutions. 46 Such clients "have house counsel fully capable of eval-
uating the quality of legal services and reviewing bills."47
Moreover, because law firms' branch offices usually have a few
large clients, bargaining power favors the client and not the law-
yer.48 One commentator therefore believes that the client ought
to decide who is best qualified to meet its legal needs. 49 The
same commentator opines that "it is disingenuous to argue that
strict qualifications are needed to protect the likes of Mitsubishi
Bank and IBM, as the consumers of legal services, from incom-
petent lawyers."50
restrictions providing that a "legal consultant may render legal advice only on
the law of the foreign country in which he or she is admitted to practice").
43. 'Ihird-country" law is law of countries other than a foreign lawyer's
home jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in which the foreign lawyer practices.
For example, Canadian law is "third-country" law to a Mexican lawyer practic-
ing in the United States.
44. Interview with Steven C. Nelson, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney, Minne-
apolis, Minnesota, and former Chair of the American Bar Association's Section
of International Law and Practice, 1988-89 (Feb. 1, 1995).
45. See Lee, supra note 37, at 114.
46. Abel, supra note 14, at 751.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. John Haley, The New Regulatory Regime for Foreign Lawyers in Japan:
An Escape From Freedom, 5 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 1, 14 (1986).
50. Id.
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The circumstances behind foreign lawyers' typical practice
also help to ensure that they are well qualified. Most foreign
lawyers work for small branches of multinational law firms51
whose work depends largely on reputation in the local commu-
nity.5 2 These branch offices "need visibility and stand or fall on
reputation, which is easily tarnished."53 With such strong in-
centive to protect their image, law firms go to great lengths to
ensure that lawyers in their foreign offices are well qualified.
It is also significant that jurisdictions with the most liberal
regulatory regimes receive few complaints about foreign law-
yers' competence. New York, for example, hosts the majority of
foreign legal consultants in the United States, 54 but has only re-
ceived six complaints about foreign lawyers in the past nineteen
years. 55 European jurisdictions have had similar experiences
with foreign lawyers. 56 This is evidence that, although foreign
and local lawyers have different training, foreign lawyers are
usually qualified to carry on an international legal practice.
Excluding third-country and international law from foreign
lawyers' scope of practice seems especially unjustified. Support-
ers of such limitations argue that foreign lawyers usually do not
have specialized training in those areas. 57 Yet local lawyers, al-
lowed by virtually all jurisdictions to advise on third-country
and international law, rarely receive specialized training or cer-
tification in those areas. Thus, in most cases, foreign lawyers
have at least the same amount of specialized training as local
lawyers. In fact, foreign lawyers are more likely to be qualified
than local lawyers to advise clients on third-country58 and inter-
51. See supra Part I.
52. Abel, supra note 14, at 751.
53. Id.
54. See Spencer, supra note 35, at 1 (noting that it is estimated that "all
but a handful of legal consultants are concentrated [in New York]").
55. Engel, supra note 2, at 36 n.4. In the same period, 178 foreign legal
consultants were licensed in New York. Id. at 36.
56. See Abel, supra note 14, at 752 (noting that, after extensive travel and
meetings with lawyers and professional associations in London, Paris, Brussels
and Amsterdam, the author "found no one who could point to a single instance
in which a serious complaint had been leveled at a foreign lawyer").
57. See Kelly C. Crabb, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries:
Making Room for the American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1767, 1796 (1983)
(suggesting that "[l]imiting the foreign lawyer to practice only in matters re-
lated to the law of his home jurisdiction, where he is already qualified, mini-
mizes the risk of harm to the public caused by defects in the training or
competency of the foreign lawyer").
58. Foreign lawyers usually have the means of obtaining reliable informa-
tion on the laws of third countries, either through their employer or through
lawyers in other countries contacted through referral networks.
166 [Vol. 5:159
REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS
national law because of their experience and international con-
tacts. Foreign lawyers' multinational law expertise is the
primary reason why clients seek their help. Also, foreign law-
yers are subject to disciplinary action in their home jurisdic-
tions, and their typical clients-governments and multinational
corporations-are fully capable of protecting themselves by fil-
ing grievances against them.59
Apart from the fear of lack of qualifications, cultural con-
cerns may prompt countries to limit foreign lawyers' scope of
practice. For instance, Japan does not allow foreign lawyers to
represent parties in international arbitration proceedings in Ja-
pan.60 This restriction limits an important and very common
function that lawyers perform for their international clients.61
Japan argues, however, that preventing foreigners from partici-
pating in any type of litigation is necessary to "prevent Japan
from becoming a litigious society."62 Although it is difficult to
determine whether this is a legitimate concern or an excuse for
protectionism, 63 an agreement liberalizing the regulation of for-
eign lawyers should address cultural concerns of the parties to
the agreement.
B. EXAMINATION REQUIREMENT
Some jurisdictions impose examination requirements before
allowing foreign lawyers to practice any kind of law.6 4 In these
jurisdictions, foreign lawyers must pass special exams that test
their knowledge of local law and procedures. Alternatively, for-
eign lawyers must meet the same requirements and pass the
same exams as local lawyers to obtain a license to practice law.
Either way, once foreign lawyers pass an examination, they are
licensed as local lawyers and can practice in all areas of the
law. 65
59. Abel, supra note 14, at 763.
60. Karen Dillon, Unfair Trade?, AM. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 54.
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
62. Japan Said to Eye Easing Rules, supra note 37.
63. Both the United States and the European Union consider the Japanese
regulatory regime unduly restrictive. See Foreign Trade Barriers, supra note 6,
at 167; Fisch-Thomsen, supra note 37, at 18. Foreign lawyers in Japan believe
that the restriction is based on the Japanese bar's fear of competition, espe-
cially from American lawyers who are known for their litigation skills. Japan
Said to Eye Easing Rules, supra note 37.
64. France, for example, has this requirement. Joanne Naiman, Bill to
Curb U.S. Lawyers Passes 1st Test in France, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 1990, at 1.
65. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
19961 167
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In practice, requiring foreign lawyers to pass examinations
constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier to foreign law-
yers.6 6 Passing these exams requires in-depth knowledge of the
local language, which foreign lawyers often do not possess.
Moreover, preparing for exams is extremely time consuming,
which presents another hurdle to foreign lawyers who are al-
ready fully engaged in practicing law.
More importantly, the vast majority of foreign lawyers do
not need or desire to be licensed as local lawyers. Few foreign
lawyers seek, for example, to litigate in the courts of their host
country or to advise in real estate transactions that require
knowledge of the nuances of local law. Instead, foreign lawyers
seek to carry on an international commercial practice,6 7 which
usually does not require an in-depth knowledge of subjects such
as local civil procedure. Therefore, requiring foreign lawyers to
pass examinations to obtain local licenses appears unnecessary.
In some cases, examination requirements may be motivated by
protectionism. 68
C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Restrictions on foreign lawyers' ability to employ or associ-
ate in partnerships with local lawyers are common. In some ju-
risdictions local lawyers can hire foreign lawyers, but not vice-
versa. 6 9 Law firms are subject to local equity restrictions in Ma-
66. A growing exception to this is young law graduates, who prepare them-
selves in advance to pass foreign bar examinations. Abel, supra note 14, at 756.
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. In France, there is evidence that the recently imposed examination re-
quirement was at least partly inspired by protectionism, especially against
American lawyers. See Richard Asthalter, French Bar Reform May Hit the U.S.
Legal Community in France, COM. iN FR., Fall 1990, at 19. Commentators fear
that the exam will be similar to the French bar exam (C.A.PA.). Id.
[The C.A.P.A.], unlike the U.S. bar examination, covers general cul-
tural topics as well as legal matters. The... floor manager [of the bill
introducing the new examination requirement in the French Assem-
bly] recalled that when he had taken the C.A.P.A. he had been asked to
treat in four hours the following statement of the Bishop of Reims: "A
l'origine des d~privations de notre 6poque, il y a toujours le snobisme
ou l'id6latrie de la sincerit6." To the great amusement of the deputies,
he then added that such a topic 'would be difficult to deal with for
someone coming from Arizona!'
Id. Because the new exam requirement is tied to a tough reciprocity require-
ment, "[t]he only incoming [American] lawyers who would be exempted from
taking the C.A.P.A. are those that come from states within the United States
where French lawyers can become members of the bar without passing the
exam." Naiman, supra note 64, at 1.
69. Abel, supra note 14, at 759.
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laysia70 and forced local partnerships in Brazil.71 In Japan, one
of the largest legal markets in the world, foreign and local law-
yers face strict regulations. A proposed law would allow foreign
lawyers to form limited partnerships, called "joint enterprises,"
but these would be highly regulated:72 foreign lawyers would be
"required to follow strict accounting guidelines in order to share
offices, and the joint enterprise [could] give only limited advice
on Japanese law."73 As part of this proposed law, Japanese law-
yers could form partnerships with individual foreign lawyers,
but not with a foreign lawyer's law firm.74 This would continue
to restrict foreign lawyers' ability to form partnerships with Jap-
anese lawyers, because the latter cannot share the world-wide
profits generated by foreign law firms. 75
Restrictions on foreign lawyers' ability to employ or form
partnerships with local lawyers can severely handicap law firms'
ability to serve their clients. These restrictions also inhibit the
growth of international law firms because they force branch of-
fices to "farm out" work locally, instead of doing it themselves
through local lawyers employed by the branch office. 76 As an
American lawyer in Mexico noted, "[b]y hiring local lawyers, you
can do things like appear before a notary to incorporate a busi-
ness, . . . [which] is bread-and-water work, because every com-
pany has to go through it."7 7
One reason jurisdictions impose restrictions on foreign law-
yers' ability to employ or form partnerships with local lawyers is
a fear that foreign lawyers may eventually dominate the local
legal market. This concern may be especially powerful in juris-
dictions where local law firms do not have the capacity to pro-
vide multinational legal services. 78 Any agreement seeking to
liberalize the regulation of foreign lawyers should properly ad-
dress this concern, recognizing that it is not only protectionist
but also cultural.
70. FOREIGN TRADE BAmERS, supra note 6, at 199.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Dillon, supra note 60, at 52.
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id.
76. Bob Rossi, NAFTA Won't Open Doors for Lawyers; Despite Negotia-
tions, Limits on Foreign Law Practices Will Remain, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25,
1993, at 8.
77. Id.
78. Such may be the case in countries where domestic law firms do not
have foreign offices or multinational capacity. This may include some Latin
American, Asian and south European countries.
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D. EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
Most jurisdictions impose experience requirements before
allowing foreign lawyers to practice law.79 For example, many
American states that license foreign legal consultants require
foreign lawyers to have practiced the law of their home jurisdic-
tion for at least five years while living in that jurisdiction.80
This requirement is very restrictive because it automatically
prevents junior associates from staffing law firms' foreign
branch offices. 8 ' Moreover, foreign lawyers often gain experi-
ence practicing the law of their home jurisdiction while living in
a foreign country, yet some states will not count this work expe-
rience toward the requirement.
The experience requirement arguably serves as a "substi-
tute for the evidence of legal expertise otherwise afforded by the
bar examination."8 2 Another justification for the requirement is
that it ensures that foreign lawyers' credentials are current and
that only experienced lawyers are allowed to practice in the host
jurisdiction. 83 However, some commentators doubt the effec-
tiveness of the requirement because, "[gliven the differences in
lawyers and requirements for admission from country to coun-
try, there is no guarantee that a lawyer with more years of expe-
rience is better qualified than one with less experience." 84 In
addition, as noted earlier, most clients of foreign lawyers are
sophisticated enough to determine the competence of their
lawyers.
E. REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES WITH UNINTENDED HARMFUL
EFFECTS
Some regulations have the unintended effect of interfering
with foreign lawyers' ability to efficiently serve their clients.8 5
For example, the United Kingdom enacted a law in 1990 al-
lowing foreign and local lawyers to form multinational partner-
79. See, e.g., Model Rule, supra note 11, at 221 (discussing experience re-
quirements in American jurisdictions).
80. See id. at 221 n.36 (noting that Alaska, Connecticut, Washington D.C.,
Hawaii, Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington all have this
requirement).
81. Cooper, supra note 14, at 5.
82. Model Rule, supra note 11, at 221.
83. See id. at 222; Crabb, supra note 57, at 1797.
84. Lee, supra note 37, at 115.
85. Model Rule, supra note 11, at 215.
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ships.86 However, such partnerships remained subject to the
same regulations as any other British law firm which meant
that all lawyers in the multinational partnership-whether
based in the United Kingdom or abroad-must pay large insur-
ance fees.8 7 Consequently, partnerships between local and for-
eign lawyers remained very expensive88 because foreign lawyers
usually work for foreign law firms. Thus, under the 1990 law it
was still very difficult for foreign lawyers to associate with local
lawyers, which in turn hinders foreign lawyers' ability to serve
their clients.
Foreign lawyers also face difficulties when jurisdictions do
not accord them the same professional privileges accorded to the
local lawyers. For instance, lawyers not licensed in countries be-
longing to the European Union8 9 do not enjoy the attorney-client
privilege in Europe. 90 Therefore, correspondence between non-
European lawyers and their clients "is not considered confiden-
tial."91 The deprivation of the attorney-client privilege, whether
or not motivated by protectionism, effectively disadvantages
non-European lawyers. New York lawyers considered this to be
such a serious problem that the state changed its rule to make it
explicitly clear that foreign lawyers in the state do have the
attorney-client privilege, hoping that the European Union
reciprocates .92
The general lack of uniformity in the regulation of foreign
lawyers further impedes multinational law firms. Since each
country regulates foreign lawyers differently, law firms must
comply with different regulations wherever they seek to estab-
lish a presence-an expensive and time consuming task. This
problem is compounded in countries like the United States and
Canada, which regulate the legal profession at the sub-national
level. 93 This system has been aptly described as a "'patchwork
86. See Roger Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community: Progress To-
wards Community Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 556, 562
(1992) [hereinafter Lawyers in the European Community].
87. Lever, supra note 39, at 17.
88. Id.
89. The European Union has promulgated regulations that affect the Euro-
pean legal profession. See infra Part III.B.
90. Chaterjee, supra note 4, at 14.
91. Id.
92. See Engel, supra note 2, at 36-37.
93. See SIDNEY CONE, THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS 1 & 53 (3rd
ed. 1984). Lawyers in the United States are regulated by the individual states.
Id. at 1; see supra note 32. Canadian lawyers are regulated by the provinces.
CONE, supra at 53.
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of regulation'" 94 that hinders multinational law firms' ability to
effectively serve their clients.95
F. OTHER RESTRICTIONS OR REQUIREMENTS
Foreign lawyers are subject to many other restrictions. For
instance, a number of small European jurisdictions, such as
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and some Swiss canons seek to ex-
clude foreigners altogether through citizenship, apprenticeship
and language competence requirements. 96 In the United States,
some jurisdictions that license foreign legal consultants impose
such complex licensing procedures that foreign lawyers consider
them practically "impenetrable."97 Some jurisdictions impose
restrictions on foreign law firms, directly affecting foreign law-
yers. China, for example, forbids foreign law firms from estab-
lishing branches in more than one city;98 Hong Kong limits the
total number of law firms allowed in the country;99 and Malay-
sia,100 Russia, Indonesia' 0 1 and, until recently, Japan, 0 2 forbid
foreign lawyers from using their firm names. 0 3
As with the right of association restrictions, many of these
restrictions arise because of local lawyers' fear that foreign law-
yers will "invade" the local market. 0 4 For example, when the
Japanese opened their door to foreign lawyers, they feared that
the United States would "'ship its surplus lawyers'" to Ja-
94. Briefly, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 2. (Quoting Steven C. Nelson,
Partner, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and former Chair of the
American Bar Association's Section of International Law and Practice, 1988-
89).
95. See Robert Rice, Dissatisfied Clients at Europe's Bars-A Barrier-Free
Market is a Long Way Off, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at 14 (quoting Mr. John
Toulmin QC, former President of the CCBE, who stated that "[i]f lawyers are
going to meet the new and increased demands from clients they must move
towards a unified position on legal practice and regulation").
96. Abel, supra note 14, at 753.
97. Dillon, supra note 60, at 54.
98. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6, at 53.
99. Chaterjee, supra note 4, at 14. But see Abel, supra note 14, at 753 (not-
ing that Hong Kong has been relatively open, "confident that its local lawyers
would be successful in the competition for clients").
100. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6, at 200.
101. Abel, supra note 14, at 759.
102. Foreign Lawyer Practice Rules, supra note 32, at 8.
103. This restriction may actually work against the protection of the public,
because it makes it more diflicult for clients to choose between foreign law firms
based on their reputation.
104. See Abel, supra note 14, at 739 (discussing the reaction of"local govern-
ments, legal associations and lawyers to the foreign 'invasion'"); Chambers,
supra note 25, at 17.
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pan.'05 This prediction proved to be wrong. As one American
lawyer in Japan noted, "'[ i t's too expensive to put a lawyer in
Tokyo, let alone surplus lawyers.'" 0 6 Similarly, the New York
regulatory regime, one of the most liberal in the world, "'has not
resulted in any flood of foreign attorneys in that state.' "107
The actual number of foreign lawyers practicing abroad,
while growing, also indicates that they are not flooding local
legal markets, even in jurisdictions hospitable to them. 08 One
expert estimates that there are only about 500 American law-
yers practicing in the European Union. 10 9 In the United States,
only 200 foreign lawyers are actually registered as foreign legal
consultants, 110 although the number of unlicensed lawyers is
probably much higher. In late 1993, seventy-six foreign lawyers
were estimated to be practicing in Japan."'
Moreover, foreign lawyers usually do not compete with local
lawyers. In Japan, Japanese lawyers practice local law" 2 while
foreign lawyers practice international law. 1 3 Similarly, Ameri-
can lawyers in Canada usually do not compete with Canadian
firms." 4 In fact, American lawyers in Canada "may actually
boost prospects of Canadian lawyers," because they provide a
ready resource to assist Canadian lawyers in American law."15
Even where foreign lawyers compete strongly with local
lawyers, competition benefits both the legal profession and its
clients. In France, for example, heated competition between for-
105. Chambers, supra note 25, at 17 (quoting Isaac (Ike) Shapiro, Partner,
Skaden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York).
106. Id. (discussing his law firm's experience with their Tokyo office).
107. Foreign Attorneys' Practice in Japan, Other Services Issues Focus of
Chicago Conference, 3 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 221 (Feb. 12, 1986) (quoting Syd-
ney Cone III, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York).
108. Fisch-Thomsen, supra note 37, at 7. If the number of law firms' foreign
branches is any indication, the number of lawyers practicing outside their home
jurisdictions is rapidly increasing. Between 1985 and 1990, American law firms
increased their number of foreign branches from 88 to 220. Abel, supra note 14,
at 764. English law firms increased their number of foreign branches from 57
in 1985 to over 140 in 1992. Id.
109. Interview with Steven C. Nelson, supra note 44.
110. Abel, supra note 14, at 758.
111. Japan Said to Make Concessions on Practice by Foreign Lawyers, 10
Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 2060 (Dec. 8, 1993).
112. Chambers, supra note 25, at 17.
113. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
114. See Crawford, supra note 23, at 16.
115. Id. (quoting John Barber, resident partner in the Canadian office of
Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods & Goodyear).
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eign and local lawyers 116 has "encouraged excellence at the
French bar"' 17 and has made Paris "one of the leading centers of
transnational law practice in the world today."118 One expert
believes competition and interaction with foreign lawyers
"raises legal standards in developing countries."119 Finally, pro-
tection from competition is "entirely out of step" with the stated
goals of trade agreements such as GATS. 120
III. EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE THE REGULATION OF
FOREIGN LAWYERS
Both the United States and the European Union have al-
ready taken measures to liberalize and standardize the regula-
tion of foreign lawyers. These measures may serve as a
foundation for further liberalization in broader contexts. The
American and European experiences should also help identify
some of the difficulties for further liberalization.
A. EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, where the legal profession is regulated
at the sub-national level, only sixteen states and the District of
Columbia license foreign legal consultants. 121 Each state's regu-
latory scheme is different. The rest of the American states do
not license foreign legal consultants, requiring foreign lawyers
to pass the local bar exam before practicing law.122
The American Bar Association (ABA), recognizing that "uni-
formity of approach among the states is of critical importance,"
initiated an effort to standardize and liberalize the regulation of
foreign lawyers in the United States. 123 In 1993, the ABA
116. See Victoria Lee, Hard Times For French Lawyers, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Feb. 1994, at 16.
117. John M. Grimes, "Une et Indivisible'-The Reform of the Legal Profes-
sion in France: The Effect on U.S. Attorneys, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1757,
1784 (1992).
118. Goebel, supra note 9, at 467.
119. Andrews, supra note 1, at 13.
120. Asthalter, supra note 68, at 20.
121. These states are: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oregon and Washington. Adams, supra note 32, at 8. These states
represent over 75% of the American legal market. See Abel, supra note 14, at
766-67.
122. Chaterjee, supra note 4, at 14.
123. Model Rule, supra note 11, at 236. The ABA decided "to take the lead
in establishing a coherent and forward-looking model for the regulation of for-
eign lawyers in [the United States]." Id.
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promulgated a Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consul-
tants. The Model Rule is largely based on the New York foreign
legal consultancy rules, 124 which, as noted earlier, are known for
their openness to foreign lawyers.
The primary requirement to qualify as a foreign legal con-
sultant under the ABA Model Rule is that the applicant be "a
member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a
foreign country, the members of which are.., subject to effective
regulation and discipline." 125 In addition, foreign legal consul-
tants must submit to state rules of professional conduct, are
subject to the same disciplinary provisions as local lawyers, and
cannot hold themselves out as members of the bar.126 The
Model Rule does not restrict foreign legal consultants' ability to
associate with local lawyers. 127 Finally, the years-of-experience
requirement discussed earlier is optional to the states adopting
the Model Rule.128
Importantly, the Model Rule does not contain an examina-
tion requirement for the foreign legal consultancy license. Since
there is no examination requirement, the Model Rule, like the
British rules, 129 does not allow licensed foreign legal consultants
to perform a specific list of activities which require in-depth
knowledge of local laws and procedures. These activities include
representing a client as an attorney in court, rendering legal ad-
vice on any state or federal law (except on the basis of advice
from a person duly qualified and entitled) and preparing docu-
ments such as real estate titles and wills and trusts. 130
Both the U.S. federal government' 3 ' and the ABA' 32 have
promised to use their "best efforts" to encourage the American
states to adopt the Model Rule or a regulation substantially sim-
ilar to it.13 3 However, for constitutional and political reasons,134
124. See Spencer, supra note 35, at 1.
125. Model Rule, supra note 11, at 208 (Model Rule § 1(a)).
126. See id. at 209-10 (Model Rule §§ 4(g), 5(a), 6).
127. See id. at 210 (Model Rule § 5(b)(i)).
128. Id. at 208 (Model Rule § 1(b)).
129. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
130. See Model Rule, supra note 11, at 209 (Model Rule §§ 4(a), (b), (c), (e)).
131. Adams, supra note 32, at 8 (explaining that the United States obligated
itself to promote the states' adaptation of the ABA model rules in GATS).
132. See Agreement Between the American Bar Association and the Order
of the Brussels Bar (August, 1994) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade).
133. See Dillon, supra note 60, at 56 (noting that "each of the . . . states
without rules allowing foreign legal consultants will feel pressure to adopt the
ABA's model rules for opening their state").
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neither the ABA nor the federal government can force the Amer-
ican states to adopt the Model Rule, and even if the states do so,
they may adopt a more restrictive version of the Model Rule.
Any effort to liberalize the regulation of foreign lawyers in an
international context will have to contend with this difficulty,
not only in the United States but also in any country where the
legal profession is regulated at the sub-national level.
B. EFFORTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Because of increasing economic integration, European law-
yers have recognized the need to harmonize the legal profession
throughout the European Union.135 The European Union en-
acted a series of Articles and Directives to achieve this harmoni-
zation. 136 Unlike the ABA Model Rule, these measures are
mandatory to all member countries. Also, these measures do not
affect the way that European Union countries regulate non-Eu-
ropean lawyers-they only apply to the way that European
countries deal with lawyers licensed in other European coun-
tries. In fact, the most important Directive in this area, dis-
cussed below, applies only to citizens of the European Union's
countries. 137 Nevertheless, the European Union's measures are
an indication of what countries may be willing to agree upon in
broader international agreements.
The most significant European Union effort to liberalize the
regulation of European lawyers is the Directive on the Mutual
Recognition of Diplomas. 38 The purpose of this Directive is to
facilitate the ability of professionals from the European Union's
member states, including lawyers, to acquire the right to fully
practice their profession in other member states. 39 Under the
Directive:
134. See Henry P. de Vries, The International Legal Profession-The Funda-
mental Right of Association, 21 INT'L LAw. 845, 847 (1987) (noting that the
American legal system "is a complex balance of national supremacy and state
sovereignty within the framework of a common law inheritance"). In fact, some
feel that "'[amn y move toward federal preemption of the licensing function [of
the states] is . . . ill advised, and perhaps, unconstitutional.'" Adams, supra
note 32, at 8 (quoting John E. Holt-Harris, Jr., Chairman of the New York
Board of Law Examiners).
135. Rice, supra note 95, at 14.
136. For an extensive discussion of these Articles and Directives, see Law-
yers in the European Community, supra note 86. See also, Barsade, supra note
17, at 317-22; Goebel, supra note 9; Rice, supra note 95.
137. Barsade, supra note 17, at 319.
138. Council Directive 89/48, 1989 O.J. (L 19) 16.
139. See Barsade, supra note 17, at 318.
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Lawyers who have completed degree and other requirements for ad-
mission to practice in one member state can be admitted to full mem-
bership in the legal profession of another member state upon
satisfaction of a requirement of "adaptation" which may be met either
through an abbreviated period of practical training or through the sat-
isfactory completion of limited examination designed to cover those ar-
eas in which the laws of the two countries differ so materially that the
lawyer's original training can be said to be "deficient" in those
areas.
140
Because of the Directive's ambitious "full membership" goal,
most member states will use an aptitude test to compensate for
the applicants' "deficiencies" with respect to local law.141
The European Union's approach is fundamentally different
from that of the ABA Model Rule because its goal is to get full
membership into the local bar for non-local European law-
yers.142 As noted earlier, the Model Rule does not require for-
eign lawyers to fulfill adaptation requirements such as
examinations to become foreign legal consultants. 143 Since the
Model Rule does not contain an examination requirement, which
can be very difficult for foreign lawyers to meet, it is a more lib-
eral and open approach than the European model.'4 On the
other hand, the Model Rule may not go far enough to satisfy lo-
cal lawyers' concerns that certain foreign lawyers may be un-
qualified. The European Union's approach, by requiring non-
local European lawyers to meet an adaptation requirement, pro-
vides more assurance that lawyers that have met this require-
ment are prepared to practice law. In other words, the
European approach is an easier pill to swallow for regulators of
the legal profession in jurisdictions throughout the world. Since
the Directive applies only to European Union nationals, how-
ever, non-European law firms and lawyers will continue to face
different and potentially restrictive regulations in each Euro-
pean member state.
140. Model Rule, supra note 11, at 218 n.30.
141. Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 86, at 598.
142. The European Union is contemplating adopting a separate measure
that would create a "registered lawyer" category. Barsade, supra note 17, at
321. The registered lawyer category would be somewhat similar to the Model
Rule's foreign legal consultancy title. This new measure, embodied in the Draft
Directive on Right of Establishment for Lawyers, has been under consideration
for at least five years. Id. at 321 n.27.
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that examination re-
quirements pose a significant barrier to foreign lawyers' entry into legal
markets).
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C. GATS PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THE REGULATION OF
FOREIGN LAWYERS
The Uruguay Round on trade produced the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS). 145 GATS "provides for the
first time a set of multilateral rules for the conduct of services
trade and simultaneously creates a framework for a continuing
process of liberalization." 146 Despite opposition from certain
GATS Members, 147 the agreement covers legal services. 148
GATS affects the regulation of foreign lawyers in two ways, dis-
cussed separately in the following two sections.
1. Liberalizing the Regulation of Foreign Lawyers Through
GATS Members' Concessions
Countries that included legal services in their schedule of
GATS commitments subject themselves to GATS provisions
such as the national treatment and the most-favored-nation
(MFN) clauses. The national treatment clause obliges each
Member, subject to its schedule of commitments, to accord to for-
eign lawyers "treatment no less favorable than that it accords to
its own like services and service suppliers." 149 This provision is
aimed at eliminating discriminatory regulations or procedures,
such as requirements of "nationality, residence, waiting periods,
or temporary stay requirements."150 A Member's inclusion of
legal services in its schedule of commitments generally amounts
"to a standstill preventing them from introducing new [discrimi-
natory] restrictions."' 5 ' Apart from this benefit, however, the
national treatment clause is of limited value in liberalizing regu-
145. GATS, supra note 7.
146. Mario A. Kakabads6, The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Im-
plications for Professional and Business Services 2, OECD Doc. DAFFE/INV/
PROF(94)3 (Sept. 6, 1994).
147. France, for example, opposed the inclusion of legal services in GATS.
The ABA strongly supported the inclusion of legal services, but later tried to
withdraw the American concessions because of its dissatisfaction with the Jap-
anese concessions. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
148. See GATS, supra note 7, art. I.
149. Id. art. XVII:.
150. Fisch-Thomsen, supra note 37, at 12.
151. Issues Paper (Note by the Secretariat) 12, OECD Doc. DAFFE/INV/
PROF(94)1 (Sept. 21, 1994). Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan
and the United States all included legal services in their schedule of commit-
ments. Julian Arkell, OECD Members' GATS Commitments in Accounting, Ar-
chitectural, Engineering, Legal and Surveying Services 3-5, 8, 12, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/INV/PROF(94)15 (Sept. 8, 1994). Mexico did not offer legal services in
its schedule of commitments. Id. at 9.
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latory regimes because lawyers' training is country specific,15 2
and therefore foreign lawyers are not exactly "like" local
lawyers. 153
The application of the GATS MFN clause will probably have
a bigger impact than the national treatment clause in the regu-
lation of foreign lawyers. The MFN clause states that "[w]ith
respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Mem-
ber shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppli-
ers of any other country."154 Simply put, MFN requires a GATS
Member to treat similar service suppliers from other GATS
Members similarly.
The MFN clause is also "unconditional." This means that
GATS Members' legal services concessions must be available on
an equal basis to all GATS Members, regardless of whether
those Members made similar concessions.' 5 5 Although Mem-
bers that included legal services in their schedule of commit-
ments were allowed to exempt themselves from the MFN clause,
none of them did so for legal services.' 5 6 This means that those
GATS Members must eliminate reciprocity requirements 5 7 in
their treatment of foreign lawyers.' 58 This change will elimi-
nate the confusion caused by such requirements.15 9
On the other hand, eliminating reciprocity requirements
may discourage the liberalization of regulatory regimes.' 60 For
152. See Fisch-Thomsen, supra note 37, at 11.
153. See Lee, supra note 37, at 120.
154. GATS, supra note 7, art. H.1.
155. Harry Broadman, International Trade and Investment in Services: A
Comparative Analysis of the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAw. 623, 633 (1993). All market
access and national treatment commitments in a country's schedule of commit-
ments must also be made on an unconditional MFN basis. Id. at 634.
156. Arkell, supra note 151, at 13-14.
157. Many jurisdictions require foreign jurisdictions to accord reciprocity if
lawyers licensed in those foreign jurisdictions wish to practice locally. For ex-
ample, the District of Columbia and at least six other American states that li-
cense foreign legal consultants have a reciprocity requirement. See Model Rule,
supra note 11, at 224.
158. Trade in Legal Services, supra note 10, at 1247.
159. The confusion was caused by the wide differences in rules regulating
foreign lawyers. It was always difficult to know whether one jurisdiction's rules
met the reciprocity requirements of other jurisdictions. See Model Rule, supra
note 11, at 216-17 (noting the "inherent difficulty in applying absolute reciproc-
ity requirements to dissimilar situations").
160. One author has specifically criticized GATS' unconditional MFN ap-
proach for this reason. Tycho Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Serv-
ices: The Case for Sidestepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 416 (1994).
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example, New York has continually liberalized its foreign legal
consultancy rules "to encourage other countries to allow them to
practice there on the basis of reciprocity." 16 1 The ABA Model
Rule itself was promulgated as a response to foreign jurisdic-
tions' reciprocity requirements. 162 Thus, removing the reciproc-
ity requirement may have eliminated an important incentive for
liberalization.
The GATS method of trade liberalization through the ex-
change of countries' concessions poses a more pronounced prob-
lem in countries where the legal profession is self-regulated. In
those countries, concessions in one's legal profession may be lit-
erally "traded away" by negotiators in exchange for concessions
in unrelated areas. As a result, legal professions that volunta-
rily liberalize their regulation of foreign lawyers may not gain
any advantages for their own lawyers. Therefore, self-regulat-
ing legal professions may have little incentive to open them-
selves to foreign lawyers.
An example will help illustrate this problem. During the
GATS negotiations, the American legal profession, through the
ABA, offered to include in the United States' schedule of com-
mitments the foreign legal consultant rules then effective in sev-
enteen American jurisdictions. 163 At the end of the GATS
As a solution, he proposes replacing GATS' unconditional MFN arrangement
with a trade agreement with multiple tiers of memberships. Under this agree-
ment, each membership tier would be characterized by objective regulatory-re-
ciprocal trade liberalization obligations. Id. at 441.
The case of aviation services may illustrate this structure. The Chi-
cago Convention defined six "freedoms" of the air... In a multiple-tier,
sectoral treaty on aviation services ... the first tier could include those
states willing to relax restrictions only on the first four freedoms of the
air. The next tier could include those willing to grant the first five free-
doms, while the third could include those willing to grant all six.
Id. at 442.
This agreement would use conditional, rather than unconditional, MFN.
Id. at 443. Each country willing to obtain membership in a certain "tier," which
would guarantee it certain "freedoms" granted by countries that belong to that
tier, would have to reciprocate by granting those countries the same "freedoms."
This would encourage liberalization because countries in lower tiers would have
the incentive of gaining new "freedoms" abroad if they allow them at home. Id.
at 442. Moreover, there would be a clear objective goal in the process of liberali-
zation, which would promote homogeneous rules regulating, for example, the
licensing of foreign legal consultants.
Apart from the merits of this proposal, it is unlikely to be adopted since
GATS chose the unconditional MFN method.
161. Issues Affecting Lawyers in U.S., Bus. L. BRIEF, Dec. 1993, available in
LEXIS, News library, BLB file.
162. Briefly, supra note 94, at 2.
163. See Dillon, supra note 60, at 54.
[Vol. 5:159
REGULATION OF FOREIGN LA WYERS
negotiations, however, the ABA lobbied vigorously to withdraw
the American concessions because it considered the Japanese
legal services concessions unacceptable. 164 In spite of the ABA's
opposition, the American concessions in legal services remained
in GATS as part of a "package deal"165 in which "Japan conceded
points on trade issues unrelated to legal services." 166
As a result of this "package deal," GATS now requires the
application of unconditional MFN to the foreign lawyers' regula-
tory regimes of seventeen American jurisdictions. 167 Therefore,
these jurisdictions can no longer impose reciprocity require-
ments. This eliminates an important incentive to induce the
Japanese bar to remove what are widely believed to be protec-
tionist restrictions on foreign lawyers' practice in Japan.168 Be-
cause of this result, the ABA and the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York believe that "'no agreement at all . . .
would be preferable to accepting' the deal that ultimately was
struck."169 In the future, the American legal profession may
have little incentive to liberalize its foreign lawyer regulatory
regime because its GATS concessions were not reciprocated.
The GATS method of liberalization through individual coun-
tries' concessions also will not help to harmonize regulatory re-
gimes because each country will continue to have different
regulations and restrictions. In addition, the GATS liberaliza-
tion method does not provide a "goal"-a certain level of liberali-
zation in the regulatory regimes-toward which the legal
profession in different jurisdictions could strive.170 Unless a dif-
ferent method for liberalization is used, the GATS Members'
concessions will remain inconsistent, perpetuating the ineffi-
cient environment in which international legal services are
provided.
164. Id. at 56.
165. Id. John Schmidt, the United States Trade Representative responsible
for the GATT negotiations "decided that he could use legal services as part of a
larger deal to help wrap up the GATT talks." Id. According to Schmidt, "[iut
was 'If you do D, we'll do A and B, and we'll split the difference on C.'" Id.
166. Adams, supra note 32, at 1.
167. Kakabads6, supra note 146, at 7-8; Adams, supra note 32, at 8 (noting
that GATS prohibits the seventeen jurisdictions, which allow foreign lawyers to
practice without a bar exam, from making any additional restrictions on foreign
attorneys).
168. See supra note 63.
169. Adams, supra note 32, at 1 (quoting John D. Feerick, president of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
170. Interview with Steven C. Nelson, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney, Minne-
apolis, Minnesota, and former Chair of the American Bar Association's Section
of International Law and Practice, 1988-89 (Oct. 11, 1994).
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2. Article VII and Recognition
Article VII of GATS, titled "Recognition," establishes a new
framework for future liberalization based on a different ap-
proach from the traditional exchange of trade concessions.' 71
Article VII allows Members to "recognize the education or expe-
171. Article VII of GATS provides as follows:
1. For the purposes of the fulfilment, in whole or in part, of its stan-
dards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of serv-
ices suppliers, and subject to the requirements of paragraph 3, a
Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, require-
ments met, or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country.
Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or
otherwise, may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the
country concerned or may be accorded autonomously.
2. A Member that is a party to an agreement or arrangement of the
type referred to in paragraph 1, whether existing or future, shall afford
adequate opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their
accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate compa-
rable ones with it. Where a Member accords recognition autono-
mously, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any other Member to
demonstrate that education, experience, licenses, or certifications ob-
tained or requirements met in that other Member's territory should be
recognized.
3. A Member shall not accord recognition in a manner which would
constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the applica-
tion of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certi-
fication of services suppliers, or a disguised restriction on trade in
services.
4. Each Member shall:
(a) within 12 months from the date on which the WTO Agreement
takes effect for it, inform the Council for Trade in Services of its
existing recognition measures and state whether such measures
are based on agreements or arrangements of the type referred to in
paragraph 1;
(b) promptly inform the Council for Trade in Services as far in ad-
vance as possible of the opening of negotiations on an agreement or
arrangement of the type referred to in paragraph 1 in order to pro-
vide adequate opportunity to any other Member to indicate their
interest in participating in the negotiations before they enter a
substantive phase;
(c) promptly inform the Council for Trade in Services when it
adopts new recognition measures or significantly modifies existing
ones and state whether the measures are based on an agreement
or arrangement of the type referred to in paragraph 1.
5. Wherever appropriate, recognition should be based on multilater-
ally agreed criteria. In appropriate cases, Members shall work in coop-
eration with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations towards the establishment and adoption of common in-
ternational standards and criteria for recognition and common inter-
national standards for the practice of relevant services trades and
professions.
GATS, supra note 7.
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rience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications
granted in a particular country"172 on a unilateral or bilateral
basis. 173 Recognition "aims at providing better than national
treatment to foreign service providers where this is needed to
ensure that they can compete on an equal basis."174 It allows
foreign professionals to compete with local lawyers without hav-
ing to retrain and requalify in aspects of the profession in which
the foreigner may already possess expertise, by recognizing the
foreigners' "qualifications, experience, licensing, registration,
etc."175 An example of this type of agreement is the European
Directive on the Mutual Recognition of Diplomas, which oper-
ates within the European Union. 176
Under Article VII, Parties to recognition agreements are
obliged to "afford adequate opportunity for other interested
Members to negotiate their accession to such an agreement or
arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it,"17v and
are prohibited from according recognition as "a disguised restric-
tion on trade in services." 178 However, in the opinion of a GATT
Counsellor, "[miutual recognition agreements will.., remain a
matter for bilateral negotiation between interested parties and
the GATS will not force such agreements to be multi-lateralised
nor insist that all foreign qualifications be treated in the same
way." 179 Nevertheless, Article VII specifies that recognition
agreements should, when appropriate, "be based on multilater-
ally agreed criteria." 80 In developing and adopting such crite-
ria for recognition, Article VII encourages its Members to "work
in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental organizations."' 8 ' In addition, GATS establishes a
Working Party on professional services to develop guidelines for
the recognition of qualifications,18 2 which "should give impetus
172. Id. art. VII:.
173. Id.
174. Issues Paper, supra note 151, at 13.
175. Id. at 17-18.
176. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
177. GATS, supra note 7, art. VII:2.
178. Id. art. VII:3. Article VII also provides that "[a] Member shall not ac-
cord recognition in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination
between countries in the application of its standards or criteria for the authori-
zation, licensing or certification of services suppliers." Id.
179. Kakabads6, supra note 146, at 7.
180. GATS, supra note 7, art. VII:5.
181. Id.
182. Issues Paper, supra note 151, at 14.
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to the process of mutual recognition of professional
qualifications." 183
Article VII in GATS may be the best avenue for the future
liberalization and standardization of regulatory regimes, al-
lowing Members to negotiate bilateral and multilateral recogni-
tion agreements. As long as such agreements are legitimately
based on the mutual recognition of professional qualifica-
tions,184 the benefits of these agreements need not be extended
to non-participating parties. This would induce other Members
to either join the agreement or "to negotiate comparable
ones,"185 and thus would help to make up for the loss of the reci-
procity requirement caused by the application of unconditional
MFN.186
D. NAFTA PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THE REGULATION OF
FOREIGN LAWYERS
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) af-
fects how each NAFTA Party-Mexico, the United States and
Canada-regulates lawyers licensed in the territories of the
other NAFTA Parties.18 7 Some of the applicable NAFTA arti-
cles, such as the national treatment and the MFN clauses,' 88
have the same effect as the GATS national treatment and MFN
clauses discussed above.'8 9 NAFTA also contains provisions
dealing with recognition of foreign service providers' qualifica-
tions. 190 However, NAFTA goes further than GATS in providing
specific provisions dealing with development of mutually recog-
183. Kakabadsd, supra note 146, at 7.
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
187. All services sectors are covered under NAFTA unless Parties take res-
ervations from the application of specific NAFTA provisions. See Broadman,
supra note 155, at 644 (describing NAFTA's "negative list" approach to the cov-
erage of services). With respect to legal services, Parties reserved the applica-
tion of numerous NAFTA provisions. See NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex I, II, VI.
Each Party must then decide which non-conforming measures it wants to list in
the agreement two years from NAFTA's entry into force. Id. arts. 1108, 1206.
Once a Party eliminates its non-conforming measures, the measure cannot
thereafter be made more restrictive. Id. arts. 1108:1(b)-(c), 1206:1(b)-(c);
Broadman, supra note 155, at 639.
188. NAFTA requires Parties to accord lawyers and law firms from other
NAFTA Parties the better of national or MFN treatment. NAFTA, supra note
8, arts. 1104, 1204.
189. See supra Part III.C.1.
190. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1210:2.
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nizable professional standards' 91 and with licensing of foreign
legal consultants.192 The NAFTA articles dealing with each of
these subjects are discussed below.
Article 1210 of NAFTA, titled "Licensing and Certification,"
allows a Party, unilaterally or by agreement, to recognize the
education, experience, licenses and certifications obtained in the
territory of another Party or of a non-Party. 193 The same article
states that "nothing in [NAFTA's MFN clause] shall be con-
strued to require the Party to accord such recognition to educa-
tion, experience, licenses or certifications obtained in the
territory of another Party."194 However, Parties that grant rec-
ognition to professional qualifications obtained in other coun-
tries must afford another Party "an adequate opportunity to
demonstrate that education, experience, licenses or certifica-
tions obtained in that other Party's territory should also be rec-
ognized or to conclude an agreement or arrangement of
comparable effect."195
Article 1210 was difficult to negotiate because of the differ-
ences in professional standards within the NAFTA Parties. 96
This is a problem in the NAFTA context because in Canada and
the United States the legal profession is self-regulated, while in
Mexico it is state-regulated. 97 To overcome this problem "the
Parties agreed that the benefits of mutual recognition need not
be automatically extended to other Parties, provided that the
latter are given an opportunity to demonstrate their eligibility
for similar treatment." 198 Importantly, the current NAFTA ar-
rangement is flexible enough so that "an agreement can be
reached between lawyers from Ontario, Illinois and/or the Fed-
eral District of Mexico, the benefits of which need not be ex-
tended automatically to practitioners from other U.S., Canadian
or Mexican jurisdictions if [they] are unable or unwilling to
abide by its rules." 99 The key, according to a Canadian negotia-
191. Id. Annex 1210.5, sec. A. Annex 1210.5 applies to measures adopted or
maintained by a Party relating to the licensing or certification of professional
service providers. Id. art. 1210:5.
192. Id. Annex 1210.5, sec. B.
193. Id. art. 1210:2.
194. Id. art. 1210:2(a).
195. Id. art. 1210:2(b).
196. See Pierre Sauv6, The Long and Winding Road: Canadian Perspectives
on NAFTA and the Professions 10, OECD Doc. DAFFE/INV/PROF(94)12 (Sept.
7, 1994).
197. Id. at 10 n.10.
198. Id. at 10-11.
199. Id. at 11.
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tor of NAFTA, was "to get the professions to embark on the road
to mutual recognition."200
On this note, a NAFTA Annex contains special provisions
dealing with the Parties' development of "mutually acceptable
standards and criteria for licensing and certification of profes-
sional service providers."20 1 The NAFTA Parties agreed in this
Annex to "encourage the relevant bodies in their respective ter-
ritories" to develop mutual recognition criteria with regard to
the following matters: (a) education, (b) examinations for licens-
ing, (c) experience required for licensing, (d) standard of conduct
and ethics, (e) professional development and re-certification, (f)
scope of licensed activities, (g) requirement of local knowledge
and (h) consumer protection.20 2 The Annex provisions also con-
tain a review mechanism to ensure progress in the development
of recognition standards and criteria.203
The NAFTA Parties also negotiated an Annex titled Foreign
Legal Consultants 20 4 which attempts to harmonize and liber-
alize the rules regulating foreign legal consultants both within
and among the NAFTA Parties. The Foreign Legal Consultants
200. Id. One of Canada's goals in the NAFTA negotiations was to develop a
"generic blueprint of rules, principles and procedural mechanisms... aimed at
encouraging all of North America's accredited professions to conclude agree-
ments on the mutual recognition of licensing and certification requirements."
Id. at 9.
201. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 1210.5 sec. A:2.
202. Id. Annex 1210.5 secs. A:2, A:3.
203. Id. Annex 1210.5 sec. A:4.
204. Id. Annex 1210.5 sec. B. The text of the Annex provides as follows:
1. Each Party shall, in implementing its obligations and commit-
ments regarding foreign legal consultants as set out in its relevant
Schedules and subject to any reservations therein, ensure that a na-
tional of another Party is permitted to practice or advise on the law of
any country in which that national is authorized to practice as a
lawyer.
Consultations with Professional Bodies
2. Each Party shall consult with its relevant professional bodies to
obtain their recommendations on:
(a) the form of association or partnership between lawyers author-
ized to practice in its territory and foreign legal consultants;
(b) the development of standards and criteria for the authorization
of foreign legal consultants in conformity with Article 1210; and
(c) other matters relating to the provision of foreign legal con-
sultancy services.
3. Prior to initiation of consultations under paragraph 7, each Party
shall encourage its relevant professional bodies to consult with the rel-
evant professional bodies designated by each of the other Parties re-
garding the development of joint recommendations on the matters
referred to in paragraph 2.
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Annex requires each Party to consult with its relevant profes-
sional bodies for their recommendations on (a) the forms of asso-
ciation or partnership between lawyers authorized to practice in
its territory and foreign legal consultants, (b) the development of
standards and criteria for the authorization of foreign legal con-
sultants in conformity with the NAFTA provisions dealing with
the licensing and certification of professionals, and (c) other
matters relating to the provision of foreign legal consultancy
services. 20 5 In addition, the NAFTA Parties agreed to en-
courage their "relevant professional bodies to consult with the
relevant professional bodies designated by each of the other Par-
ties regarding the development of joint recommendations" on
these matters.20 6 Finally, the NAFTA foreign legal consultancy
provisions require each Party to "establish a work program to
develop common procedures throughout its territory for the au-
thorization of foreign legal consultants." 20 7 This will be difficult
for the United States and Canada because both countries regu-
late the legal profession at the sub-national level.20 8
NAFTA's provisions dealing with the regulation of foreign
lawyers-Article 1210 on recognition, the professional stan-
dards and the foreign legal consultancy provisions-are all sub-
ject to an important restriction. Because of their location in the
NAFTA document, these provisions apply to the provision of
Future Liberalization
4. Each Party shall establish a work program to develop common pro-
cedures throughout its territory for the authorization of foreign legal
consultants.
5. Each Party shall promptly review any recommendation referred to
in paragraphs 2 and 3 to ensure its consistency with this Agreement.
If the recommendation is consistent with this Agreement, each Party
shall encourage its competent authorities to implement the recommen-
dation within one year.
6. Each Party shall report to the Commission within one year of the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, and each year thereafter, on
its progress in implementing the work program referred to in para-
graph 4.
7. The Parties shall meet within one year of the date of entry into
force of this Agreement with a view to:
(a) assessing the implementation of paragraphs 2 through 5;
(b) amending or removing, where appropriate, reservations on for-
eign legal consultancy services; and
(c) assessing further work that may be appropriate regarding for-
eign legal consultancy services.
Id.
205. Id. Annex 1210.5 sec. B:2.
206. Id. Annex 1210.5 sec. B:3.
207. Id. Annex 1210.5 sec. B:4.
208. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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legal services by individual lawyers not employed by foreign law
firms. 20 9 Therefore, even if an agreement is reached under the
NAFTA provisions discussed above, a NAFTA Party can require
that applicants for licenses under such agreements not be em-
ployed by foreign law firms. This could be an important barrier
to foreign lawyers, because, as discussed earlier, most foreign
lawyers are employed by law firms. 210
NAFTA's most important accomplishments are twofold.
First, Mexico agreed to develop foreign legal consultancy rules
throughout its territory. 211 Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, NAFTA successfully "set the stage for future talks, while
lawyers in each country lay the groundwork for integrating their
profession down the line."212 Thus, the legal profession in each
country will play a crucial role in deciding when and how to lib-
eralize the regulation of their foreign peers.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
UNDER NAFTA AND GATS
Overall, NAFTA and GATS did not achieve an immediate
liberalization of foreign lawyers' regulatory regimes. Instead,
both agreements lay out a structure for future negotiations be-
tween countries, their national subdivisions and the legal pro-
fession. This Part discusses a few of the most likely agreements
that may be reached under the structures that NAFTA and
GATS provide. Consistent with NAFTA and GATS, the goal of
these agreements should be to protect the public and the integ-
rity of the profession while achieving a maximum level of liber-
alization.213  Undoubtedly, negotiating parties of these
209. The recognition, professional standards and foreign legal consultancy
provisions are contained in Chapter 12 of NAFTA. Chapter 12 covers the
across-border" provision of services. NAFTA, supra note 8, Chapter 12. The
"cross-border" mode is the provision of legal services in one Party by lawyers
licensed in another Party, not including the provision of a service through the
investment mode. Id. art. 1213:2. The "investment" mode, covered in Chapter
11 of NAFTA, includes the provision of legal services by the branch office of a
Party's law firm in the territory of another Party. Id. art. 1101.
210. See supra Part I.
211. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex VI, at VI-M-2. Until now, foreign lawyers
seeking to practice law in Mexico have had to go through a complex procedure
to avoid being subject to a citizenship requirement. See CONE, supra note 93, at
92. Foreign lawyers also had to meet Mexico's educational requirement, usu-
ally through supplemental studies in Mexico. Id.
212. Rossi, supra note 76, at 8 (quoting D. Holly Hammonds, Associate Gen-
eral Counsel with the Office of the United States Trade Representative during
the NAFTA negotiations).
213. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; Sauv6, supra note 196, at 6.
[Vol. 5:159
REGULATION OF FOREIGN LA WYERS
agreements will look to past experiences such as the American
and European liberalization efforts for guidance.
A. NAFTA-BASED FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANCY AGREEMENT
The NAFTA Parties may reach an agreement based on the
NAFTA Annex, discussed above, titled "Foreign Legal Consul-
tants."214 This Foreign Legal Consultancy Agreement (FLCA)
would be negotiated and work as follows. The "relevant profes-
sional bodies" of each NAFTA Party would develop joint recom-
mendations on the licensing of foreign legal consultants. 215 The
relevant professional bodies would presumably include bar as-
sociations and especially the licensing authorities of each coun-
try.216 The joint recommendations would delineate the licensing
requirements, rights and responsibilities of foreign legal
consultants.While speculating about the details of the joint recommen-
dation is beyond this Note's scope, it should be based on "objec-
tive and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability
to provide a service," as NAFTA requires. 217 At a minimum, the
joint recommendation should allow foreign legal consultants to
practice the law of the country in which they are licensed,218 and
perhaps third-country and international law.219 The joint rec-
ommendation should also contain provisions dealing with for-
eign lawyers' right to associate with local lawyers. 220 Although
negotiators of the joint recommendation are not required to do
so, they should strive to allow foreign legal consultants to be em-
ployed by foreign law firms. Finally, examination or educational
requalification requirements should be avoided.22' This makes
214. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. Negotiations on liber-
alizing foreign lawyers' regulatory regimes are already underway between the
NAFTA Parties. Interview with Steven C. Nelson, supra note 44 (noting that
the NAFTA Parties met in Mexico in 1994 and were scheduled to meet in March
of 1995 to discuss the subject).
215. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 1210.5 sec. B:3.
216. Interview with Steven C. Nelson, supra note 44. In the United States
and Canada, this would mean, respectively, the licensing authorities in the
states and provinces.
217. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1210:1(a).
218. This is a NAFTA requirement. See NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex
1210.5 sec. B:1.
219. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
220. This is a NAFTA requirement. See NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex
1210.5 sec. B:2(a).
221. See supra Part II.B.
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sense because, similar to the ABA Model Rule, foreign legal con-
sultants' scope of practice under the FLCA would be limited.
If the joint recommendation is consistent with NAFTA and
acceptable to the NAFTA Parties, the governments of the three
NAFTA Parties would encourage their respective local authori-
ties to implement the FLCA.222 The FLCA would then be incor-
porated into NAFTA and would become a commitment at the
national level. However, the FLCA would not bind the Parties'
sub-national jurisdictions (i.e. the Parties' states or provinces).
Instead, the sub-national jurisdictions would have the option to
participate in the FLCA. Although this complicates the agree-
ment, this arrangement is necessary because the legal profes-
sion is regulated at the sub-national level in both the United
States and Canada, and their national governments are unlikely
to invade this area of regulation.223
Once the FLCA is part of NAFTA, the Parties' jurisdictions
could opt into the agreement. When a jurisdiction opts into the
agreement, it would commit to license foreign lawyers from
other participating jurisdictions as foreign legal consultants as
provided in the FLCA. Eligible foreign lawyers would then gain
all the rights and responsibilities outlined in the FLCA.
To illustrate how the FLCA may work, suppose that three
NAFTA jurisdictions, e.g., Illinois, Ontario and the Federal Dis-
trict of Mexico participate in the FLCA.224 Because of Illinois'
participation in the FLCA, a lawyer licensed there would oper-
ate under favorable foreign legal consultancy rules in the
Federal District of Mexico and Ontario. This arrangement
would leave lawyers from non-participating jurisdictions, say
Michigan, at a disadvantage because they could not take advan-
tage of the favorable FLCA provisions in Ontario and the Fed-
eral District of Mexico. However, this would give Michigan
lawyers an incentive to persuade Michigan to join the FLCA. In
fact, most jurisdictions that currently license foreign legal con-
sultants began licensing them in response to local lawyers'
requests. 225
222. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 1210.5 sec. B:2(a).
223. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying note 199.
225. See, e.g., Koenig, supra note 5, at E01 (noting that the Indiana foreign
legal consultancy rules were instituted at the request of an Indiana lawyer);
Interview with Steven C. Nelson, supra note 44. See also Cooper, supra note
14, at 5 (noting that New York began licensing foreign legal consultants be-
cause "New York lawyers wanted to eliminate the resistance of other countries
to opening offices abroad").
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The incentive to join the FLCA is similar to the incentives
created by reciprocity requirements. 226 However, the FLCA
would have the advantage of creating a standard for foreign law-
yers' regulation, at least among the participatory NAFTA juris-
dictions. This would avoid the confusion created by typical
reciprocity requirements. 227 Moreover, because the licensing re-
quirements and rights and responsibilities of foreign legal con-
sultants would be clearly delineated in the FLCA, the new
regulatory system would be transparent.
As described here, joining the FLCA would be optional. For
the FLCA to succeed, it will have to satisfy the professions' con-
cerns in licensing foreign lawyers, such as their possible lack of
qualifications and the fear that foreign lawyers will invade the
local market. To ensure that these concerns are properly ad-
dressed, participants in the FLCA negotiation (i.e. the joint rec-
ommendation) should include representatives of the larger
Mexican bar associations, representatives of the American
states that currently host most foreign lawyers (e.g. New York)
and representatives of the Canadian provinces that have foreign
legal consultant regulatory regimes in place. The FLCA's ac-
ceptance among the NAFTA jurisdictions will most likely be de-
termined at the negotiation stage.
B. GATS OR NAFTA-BASED RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
GATS and NAFTA allow jurisdictions to unilaterally, bilat-
erally or multilaterally grant recognition to the education, expe-
rience, licenses or certifications obtained by lawyers in other
jurisdictions.228 To secure greater rights for their own lawyers
abroad, jurisdictions will undoubtedly seek to enter into mutual
recognition agreements with specific foreign jurisdictions. 229 If
226. This requirement, as noted earlier, was eliminated by the application of
unconditional MFN. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text. The
FLCA, however, would not have to comply with GATS' unconditional MFN be-
cause the FLCA would operate within a free trade area. Free Trade Agree-
ments are excepted from the MFN clause under Article V of GATS, titled
"Economic Integration." GATS, supra note 7, art. V. The exception is subject
to certain requirements, but there is little doubt that NAFTA, as a whole, quali-
fies as a free trade area. See NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 101.
227. See supra note 159.
228. GATS, supra note 7, art. VI:l; NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1210:2.
229. This approach to liberalizing the regulation of foreign professionals has
already been used by the accountancy profession. In 1991, the American and
Canadian accountants developed mutual recognition criteria with respect to ed-
ucation, examination and experience qualifications of accountants licensed in
their subnationaljurisdictions. See Principles for Reciprocity (Am. Inst. of Cer-
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possible, such recognition agreements should be based on multi-
laterally agreed-upon criteria developed by the legal profession,
sub-national jurisdictions and national governments. 230 Thus,
similar to the NAFTA-based FLCA, recognition agreements will
probably be negotiated jointly by representatives of national
governments, sub-national jurisdictions and the legal profes-
sion.23 ' Also, for the reasons discussed earlier, countries where
the legal profession is regulated at the sub-national level would
most likely have to make recognition agreements optional to
their sub-national units.232
Jurisdictions may use recognition agreements to allow for-
eign lawyers to practice locally without requiring them to pass
examinations or fulfill adaptation periods, which, as discussed
earlier, can be very restrictive barriers to foreign lawyers. 233
Under these agreements, jurisdictions may mutually recognize
all of the professional qualifications acquired by lawyers in each
other's jurisdictions. Since foreign lawyers are not trained to
practice local law, the scope of practice of foreign lawyers li-
censed under such agreements would be limited to the foreign
lawyers' areas of recognized expertise. This type of recognition
agreement would be very similar to the ABA Model Rule, which
recommends that foreign lawyers be licensed as foreign legal
consultants without examinations but with a limited scope of
practice. 23 4 These agreements would probably also contain pro-
visions for the public's protection, such as requiring them to
tified Pub. Acct., Canadian Inst. of Chartered Acct., and Natl Ass'n of State
Bds. of Acct.), Sept. 16, 1991, at 3. This recognition effort for the accountancy
profession continued under NAFTA and GATS. See NAFTA, supra note 8, art.
1410, Annex 1210.5 sec. C; GATS, supra note 7, art. VII. In fact, the GATS
Working Party has given the accountancy profession priority over the legal pro-
fession in developing multilateral recognition criteria. Kakabadsd, supra note
146, at 7. Although comparing the legal and accountancy profession has limita-
tions because of the differences between the two professions, the recognition
criteria to be established by the GATS Working Party may help future recogni-
tion efforts in the legal field. Additionally, the recognition method to liberalize
the regulation of foreign accountants may help cautious regulators of the legal
profession feel at ease in using a similar method to liberalize the regulation of
foreign lawyers.
230. See GATS, supra note 7, art. VII:5; NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex
1210.5 sec. A.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 215-216.
232. See supra notes 134, 223 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
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abide by local rules of conduct 235 and contribute to some form of
agreed-upon liability insurance.236
Ultimately, whether jurisdictions are able to reach such lib-
eral recognition agreements will depend on the local professions'
level of assurance that lawyers licensed in certain foreign juris-
dictions are properly trained and subjected to meaningful ethi-
cal obligations and disciplinary procedures. 237 Thus, countries
that have similar legal systems, provide similar legal education
and have similar professional qualifications are more likely to
reach recognition agreements. Candidates for this type of recog-
nition agreements may be, for example, jurisdictions within the
United States, Canada and England. Certain civil-code coun-
tries may also feel sufficiently comfortable with each other's pro-
fessional qualifications to conclude similar recognition
agreements.
More limited recognition agreements are also conceivable.
For example, education and examination qualifications acquired
in one jurisdiction may be recognized in another. Foreign law-
yers with the recognized qualifications may then be required to
take an exam to qualify as a full local lawyer in the other juris-
diction. Used this way, recognition agreements may draw heav-
ily from the European Directive on the Mutual Recognition of
Diplomas, which requires foreign lawyers to undergo an adapta-
tion period to compensate for their deficiencies with respect to
local law.238 This type of limited recognition agreement may be
useful to liberalize regulatory regimes in countries where for-
eign lawyers are currently required to completely requalify
before allowing them to practice any kind of law. This type of
recognition agreement may also be useful between jurisdictions
that have very different examination or certification
requirements.
Whatever the form of recognition agreements, jurisdictions
that take part in them must not use them as a means of discrim-
ination, or as a disguised restriction on trade in services. 239 In
addition, parties to recognition agreements must afford non-par-
235. The ABA Model Rule contains this requirement. See supra note 126
and accompanying text.
236. There is always the remote danger that a foreign legal consultant may
leave the country in case of malpractice. See Lee, supra note 37, at 115.
237. Regulators seem primarily concerned with foreign lawyers' potential
lack of qualifications. See supra Part II.
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. See supra note 178 and accompanying text; NAFTA, supra note 8, art.
1210:1(c).
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ties an opportunity to demonstrate that the professional qualifi-
cations obtained in their territories are also deserving of
recognition.240 Alternatively, parties must allow non-parties an
opportunity to negotiate comparable recognition agreements. 241
However, as a GATT Counsellor noted, GATS is unlikely to force
bilateral agreements to be multilateralized. 242
V. CONCLUSION
Clients increasingly demand that their lawyers be able to
service all their legal needs-both at home and abroad. Foreign
lawyers enable the legal profession to provide the services that
modern clients demand. Foreign lawyers' efforts to provide effi-
cient and cost-effective legal services are hindered, however, by
an array of restrictions that create an inefficient environment
for the delivery of international legal services. The lack of uni-
form rules regulating foreign lawyers only magnifies these
inefficiencies.
Both the United States and the European Union have taken
some steps to address this problem. Overall, their efforts have
had limited effect. Negotiators of NAFTA and GATS also set out
to liberalize the regulation of foreign lawyers' regulatory re-
gimes. However, as the GATS negotiations seem to indicate, the
traditional method of liberalization through trade concessions
may not succeed in liberalizing the regulation of foreign lawyers.
While neither GATS nor NAFTA achieved significant imme-
diate liberalization, both agreements established a structure for
future dialogue and negotiations between governments, sub-na-
tional jurisdictions, and representatives of the legal profession.
This structure allows jurisdictions to reach flexible agreements
to liberalize the regulation of foreign lawyers. Under NAFTA, a
Foreign Legal Consultancy Agreement may be reached between
interested jurisdictions throughout North America. Under
either NAFTA or GATS, jurisdictions may reach recognition-
based agreements that could liberalize foreign lawyers' regula-
tory regimes to various degrees. It is largely up to the legal pro-
fession throughout the world to take advantage of these
opportunities and improve the environment for the delivery of
international legal services.
240. See supra notes 177, 195 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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